Abstract: This paper suggests that the ability of consumers to choose accurately between alternative suppliers is substantially limited even in a relatively simple and transparent market. Across two independent datasets from the UK electricity market we find, on aggregate, that those consumers switching exclusively for price reasons appropriated between a quarter and a half of the maximum gains available. While such outcomes can be explained by high search costs, the observation that at least a fifth of the consumers actually reduced their surplus as a result of switching cannot. We consider and reject several alternative explanations to pure decision error. 
Introduction
Competition policy and other policy initiatives in markets as diverse as health and education are increasingly based on the presumption that consumers can play a positive role in generating market competition by choosing to trade with the supplier that best suits their needs. However, consumers may be unable to perform this role and competitive forces may be consequently weakened for several reasons. Consumers may be unwilling to change suppliers because of switching costs, unaware of alternative suppliers because of search costs or may face difficulties in evaluating and comparing different suppliers' offers because of cognitive decision-making costs 1 . While previous empirical research has largely focussed on identifying the effects of switching costs, this paper investigates the importance of the last two possibilities by analysing empirically the accuracy with which switching consumers choose their best available alternative supplier.
We exploit two independent datasets from the UK electricity market where consumers have been free to switch away from their regional incumbent to one of several entrants since the market's liberalisation in 1999. In such a market, we would expect consumers' switching decisions to be relatively accurate for several reasons. First, almost all households consume electricity and for many, it forms a significant part of their household budget. Second, the market is relatively simple as firms supply a near-homogenous good and at the time of our surveys each supplier effectively offered only a single tariff option. Third, the market is transparent with the industry regulator and several online price comparison services providing many forms of advice and tariff information. Yet, despite such market conditions, this paper suggests that the inaccuracy of consumers' switching decisions remains substantial. Even when focussing only on the consumers who, when asked, indicated that they had switched suppliers exclusively for price reasons, we find that across the two datasets and under a range of assumptions, only 8-19% of consumers switched to the firm offering the highest surplus and, in aggregate, switching 1 See Farrell and Klemperer (2006) for a review of the market power effects of switching costs, Baye et al (forthcoming) for search costs, and Gabaix et al (2005) for cognitive costs.
consumers appropriated only between 28% and 51% of the maximum gains available to them. While such behaviour is wholly consistent with the behaviour of rational consumers facing high search costs, the additional finding that 20-32% of switching consumers appear to have lost surplus through their choice of supplier is not. These consumers lost an average £14-35 per year in increased bills, apart from any other switching costs they may have incurred.
Very little previous research has examined empirically the switching accuracy of consumers. As part of a much wider investigation into the effects of entry in the New York State telephone market, Economides et al (2006) suggest that 42% of consumers switched to a more expensive supplier, resulting in an average loss of $4.33 per month. Giulietti et al (2005) suggest there may be consumer inaccuracy in the UK gas market by showing that consumers' (binary) switching decisions appear unrelated to the monetary gains available from doing so, especially for consumers who expect price differences to be transitory. A larger literature however, has analysed the widespread potential for consumers to select a non-cost minimising option from a menu of tariffs offered by the same firm. Agarwal et al (2006) , for example, suggest that over 40% of consumers selected the more expensive tariff when offered the option of two credit card contracts in a market experiment by a US bank, while Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) use data from a German internet provider to estimate that around a third of consumers chose a more expensive fixed rate tariff, and over half of these paid more than double the cheapest alternative.
The proposed explanations for such choices fall into three broad categories.
First, consumers may show a preference for certain tariff structures, such as flat-rate fees (Lambrecht and Skiera 2006) . We find no support for such an explanation as the gains from switching are largely unrelated to any associated change in tariff structure. Second, in comparing tariffs, consumers may weight inappropriately the various components of a tariff or price, such as the introductory rate, shipping charge or state-tax rate (e.g. Ausubel 1999 , Hossain and Morgan 2006 , Ellison and Ellison 2006 . This explanation is not supported by our data which show that the gains made by consumers who switched to suppliers offering a potentially focal 'dual-supply' discount are not significantly different from the gains made by other consumers. Third, consumers may evaluate alternative suppliers' tariffs using an incorrect prediction of their own future consumption (Miravete 2003 , Della Vigna and Malmendier 2004 . This explanation also appears unconvincing as all results are derived from consumers' own (expenditure) beliefs and remain robust across consumption variations of plus and minus ten percent.
Highlighted by the recent widespread allegations about such practices within the industry, one plausible explanation of the results concerns the pressurising or misleading influence of suppliers' sales activities. However we find that the accuracy of consumers' choices are not significantly related to the self-reported influence of a sales agent; nor does an increased number of regional competitors, which might result in increased sales activity, consistently reduce the accuracy of decisions. Instead, the paper concludes that consumers' switching inaccuracy is consistent with pure decision error.
This finding underlines the importance of the growing research into the incentives firms may face to exploit or induce consumer confusion -see Ellison and Ellison (2005) or Armstrong and Spiegler (2007) for a further discussion.
Section 2 provides a brief theoretical foundation for the measures of the gains from switching that are later calculated. Section 3 introduces the market, the data and the calculation procedures. The descriptive results are presented in section 4. Section 5 proposes some potential explanations for the results and presents some further analysis to test them; section 6 concludes.
Theory
To analyse the accuracy of consumers' switching decisions it is necessary to calculate both the actual gains in surplus that each consumer made through their choice of new supplier and the maximum possible gains that each consumer could have achieved by switching to their best supplier (given their demand characteristics). We now present some simple measures to form the basis of such calculations.
Consider consumer i 's decision to switch away from his old supplier, o , to a new supplier, n , chosen from his set of alternative suppliers, i S . Assuming that consumer i cares only about the tariff offered by each supplier, equation
(1) describes the approximate annual gain in consumer surplus (excluding switching costs) from deciding to switch from supplier o to supplier, n ,
where the consumer surplus received at any firm j consists of the utility from With the use of a revealed preference argument to ensure that C , at each supplier, (2). Such an upper bound is very close to the approximate change in surplus described by (1) when demand is highly price inelastic, as in the electricity market (Baker et al 1989) . 
Calculations
This section uses the measures constructed in section 2 to analyse the switching accuracy of two sets of consumers in the UK electricity market.
After an introduction to the market in section 3.1, section 3.2 presents the data and illustrates how the UK electricity market is particularly well suited for such an analysis. Section 3.3 explains how the final calculations are made.
The Market
Since liberalisation of the UK residential electricity market was completed in mid 1999, electricity suppliers have been permitted to enter each of the fourteen regional markets to compete with the original regional incumbent.
While few new suppliers chose to enter the industry, many regional incumbents took the opportunity to enter most, if not all, of the regions in which they had not previously been incumbent, as did the national gas supplier, British Gas. Consumers were free to switch away from their regional incumbent (or any subsequent supplier) with twenty-eight days notice and no financial penalty. In the subsequent eight years about half of all energy consumers moved away from their regional incumbent.
An example of the range of tariffs on offer to consumers is displayed in Suppliers typically offer two-part tariffs, with some offering three-part tariffs that contain an additional marginal rate for higher levels of consumption beyond some threshold. The majority of electricity suppliers who are also active in the gas market increasingly participate in mixed bundling by offering a dual-supply discount to those consumers who choose to buy both forms of energy. While it is common for suppliers to approach consumers directly in the hope of persuading them to switch, it is rare for suppliers to use upfront discounts or incentives. Each supplier offers a tariff across three payment methods. Each tariff consists of an (possibly zero) annual fixed fee, Fixed, with an additional marginal rate, Rate1 in pence/kWh, and, in some cases, a second marginal rate, Rate2, for consumption over and above some annual breakpoint, Threshold (in kWh). Dual supply discounts are offered only to credit or direct debit consumers (except by East Midland/Powergen who offer them to all consumers). Additional discounts are labelled with numbers in brackets -(1) 3% off Direct Debit if bill exceeds £10.50 (2) £8.40 off credit and direct debit.
Data
Two datasets were constructed from two independent, cross-sectional, faceto-face surveys of consumers in England, Scotland and Wales. The EA survey (Cooke et al 2001) A major constraint on the ability to measure consumers' switching accuracy arises from the possibility that consumers switched for reasons other than price. Whilst non-price gains are likely to be small in a near-homogeneous market like electricity, they may arise from two sources. First, although the reliability of supply is independent of the supplier (since it depends upon the vertically separated distribution function), consumers may perceive that firms vary in attributes such as customer service or environmental awareness.
Second, in addition to the possible monetary benefits of being supplied electricity and gas by the same supplier, for which we account for, consumers may perceive some non-price, practical benefits from having to deal with only one supplier. To eliminate these possibilities, we restrict our analysis to a subset of consumers who stated that their switching decision was motivated purely by price. Specifically, two sub samples are created that contain 318
and 154 consumers respectively who, when asked, cited only differences in price as a reason for switching and did not mention factors such as the quality of service, the provision of 'environmental' tariffs or the practical benefits of being dual-supplied. A full summary of the consumers' (multiple) reasons for switching suppliers is presented in Tables 2a and 2b 5 . 
Tables 2a and 2b: Reasons for Switching Suppliers across the Two Datasets

Calculating the Gains from Switching
This section provides further details of how the bound measures constructed in section 2 are used with the selected data samples to calculate consumers' switching accuracy.
To focus only on the accuracy of consumers' choice of supplier and not on the choice of payment method or gas supplier, all calculations are made by comparing suppliers' relevant tariffs whilst treating each consumer's known choice of payment method(s) and gas supplier as given. Specifically, the calculations are made using equations (5)- (7), where the tariff of each supplier, ( , ) tr T m g , varies according to the consumer's date of switching, t , electricity supply region, r , choice of gas supplier, g , and choice of payment method, m , (both before and after switching).
Using a time series of the unique tariff offered by each supplier per payment method 6 , an estimate of consumption, ˆn i C , was calculated from each consumer's own estimate of their average electricity expenditure 7 . Such an approach offers two advantages. First, it is probably more accurate as consumers are more likely to recall their expenditure than their consumption.
Second, and more importantly, all gains are calculated in a way that is consistent with consumers' own consumption beliefs, so that any inaccurate consumer choices cannot be attributed to consumers' incorrect consumption estimates. A potential drawback, however, comes from the possibility that each consumer's expenditure beliefs may have changed in the intervening period between the time of the switching decision and the time of the survey.
We take two approaches to allow for this possibility and to add further robustness to the findings. First, we identify a subgroup of the EA consumers whose survey responses indicated that their consumption was highly price inelastic, and stable over time, and demonstrate that these do not differ significantly from the rest of the sample 8 . The insignificant difference supports the claims that i) the constructed upper bounds form close approximations to the true gains from switching and ii) consumption is likely to be stable between the time of switching and the time of the survey. Second, we repeat the three measurements for all consumers using consumption levels which are plus and minus ten percent of our original estimate.
Whilst the CCP dataset is sufficiently rich to provide all the required information, the EA dataset does not provide all the necessary variables directly from the survey because of uncertainty about the exact date of switching and of any change in payment method. To proceed we derive the EA calculations under the four most likely scenarios and compare the results for robustness. This leads to the specifications, Oct99nochange, Oct99change, Jun00nochange and Jun00change, which are detailed fully in the appendix.
Descriptive Results
Figure 1 plots the estimated actual gains from switching against the maximum gains available for all consumers (averaging across the EA specifications outlined above). Two immediate observations can be made. First, many of the consumers have not appropriated the maximum gains available, as indicated by the points located below the 45° line. This is c onsistent with the behaviour of rational consumers facing search costs and with experimental evidence that suggests consumers often search too little (Sonnemans 1998 and Tenorio and Cason 2002) . Second, however, a significant fraction of switchers appear to have actually lost surplus by switching to a more expensive supplier, as indicated by the points below the x-axis, a finding which is inconsistent with the behaviour of rational consumers motivated to switch only by price. To explore the findings in more detail, Table 3 displays the main results derived from the original estimates of consumption and Table 4 includes the results with the alternative consumption levels. The results shown in tables 3 and 4 are remarkably robust across datasets, across specifications and across consumption levels, providing support for the chosen measurement methodology. Despite including only decisions based exclusively on price, many consumers failed to switch to the cheapest supplier.
Across datasets, specifications and consumption levels, the reported percentage of consumers selecting their cheapest supplier ranges between only 8 and 19%. Although consumers as a whole made positive average gains of between £16 and £22 per annum, in aggregate, consumers appropriated only between 28 and 51% of the maximum benefits available to them. Maximum Gains Available refers to the change in surplus that would have been realised by a switcher had they switched to their cheapest alternative supplier. Mean Gains Available refers to the change in surplus that a switcher would expect to gain by selecting a supplier randomly. The Proportion of Switchers with Perfect Gains refers to the proportion of consumers who appropriated all of the maximum gains available. This is compared to the expected probability of doing so had the consumer randomly selected an alternative supplier. The Proportion of Switchers with Dominated Choice refers to the proportion of consumers that switched to a tariff that could not be cheaper than their previous tariff for any level of consumption. it is difficult to make robust comparisons given the biases within each of the samples, our data provide no evidence that switching accuracy improved over the five years which elapsed between the two surveys.
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Potential Explanations
The existence of search costs can explain why consumers did not select the best possible supplier, but the choice of a more expensive supplier remains puzzling. In this section we explore the validity of four possible explanations: i) consumers exhibited some bias or preference for particular tariff structures;
ii) consumers were overly-attracted to suppliers offering dual-supply discounts;
iii) consumers were influenced by misleading sales activity; and iv) consumers made genuine decision errors.
First, we consider the possibility that consumers' choices could be explained by a bias or preference for different tariff structures, as proposed in the literature documenting consumers' inaccurate tariff choices (e.g. Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). While the potential for such biases is limited in our market due to the narrow range of available tariff structures, we investigate the potential for consumers to have displayed a preference for tariff structures in two respects -the number of parts in the tariff (two or three) and whether or not there is a positive fixed fee. The evidence for such biases seems limited. .
Potential Mis-selling
In this section we estimate whether the consumers' switching accuracy is related to two sets of test variables associated with potential mis-selling. We analyse each in turn. First, we explore whether the accuracy of consumers' switching decisions is adversely affected by the self-reported influence of suppliers' sales activity, as captured by two dummy variables from the EA survey. These correspond to consumers either reporting that they had been 
We use equation (6) to explore how consumers' switching gains depend on a set of independent variables in two ways. In the first case, * swg i y is treated as a latent variable and we estimate the probability of a consumer making a positive gains using a probit model, and in the second case, we model the gains from switching as a continuous variable using OLS with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. For robustness, the two estimations are conducted across each of the four EA data specifications and the results are reported in Tables 6 and 7 .
The self-reported incidences of sales and 'conning activity' have no significant effect on switching accuracy across all specifications. The estimations also indicate, in line with the findings of Economides et al (2006) and Miravete (2003) , that very few demographic variables are useful predictors of the ability of consumers to make accurate decisions. Consumers living in rented property make less accurate decisions, probably because they expect to enjoy any benefits for a shorter time. Some of the specifications suggest that consumers with higher incomes (and those who declined to reveal their incomes) appropriate less of the available gains. Consumers are less likely to make a loss from switching suppliers if the maximum gains available are higher, a finding consistent with consumers having a higher incentive to make an accurate decision when the rewards from doing so are greater. There is no evidence that previous experience improves decision accuracy.
While Giulietti et al (2005) suggest that consumers are more likely to switch in a given market if they have previously switched in others, we find that a past experience of switching gas suppliers does nothing to improve (and sometimes reduces) switching accuracy.
To provide a further (less direct) test of the effects of mis-selling, the estimations are repeated with the inclusion of a different test variable -the number of competitors in each consumer's regional market. While conventional theories of consumer search do not predict any negative relationship between consumers' ability to appropriate the gains available Tables 8 and 9. 16 Indeed, for any given price distribution and cost of search, a consumer should accept any discovered price below the optimal reservation price which is defined independently from the number of firms (Kohn and Shavell 1974) . 17 These numbers refer to the number of large firms that were patronised by consumers in the EA sample and do not include some smaller firms that also operated across all regions. Including such firms in the estimations increases the number by a constant and does not affect our qualitative results. No such variation in firm numbers existed at the time of the CCP survey due to later market consolidation. 18 It is feasible, but unlikely given the limited variation in the number of firms, that consumer inaccuracy may also be prompted by a 'choice overload' effect from the increased complexity of the decision (e.g. Lepper 2000 and Kamenica 2007) . 19 Both the number of competitors and the maximum gains can be included as explanatory variables, since they have a negligible correlation of approximately 0.02 across specifications. While there is no evident relationship between the number of regional competitors and the probability of making a positive gain by switching, Table 9 suggests that in two out of four specifications, consumers appropriated relatively less of the maximum available gains in regions with a higher number of suppliers. However as much of the variation in the number of regional competitors arises, however, from the relative lack of market entry in the two Scottish electricity regions, such a finding is also consistent with the presence of some unobserved characteristic of firms or consumers within the Scottish markets. The results are therefore unclear and do not provide direct evidence that mis-selling explains the inaccuracy of consumers' switching decisions.
The evidence presented in this section does not indicate that consumers' poor switching choices are explained by tariff biases or suppliers' mis-selling activity. We deduce that much of the switching inaccuracy results from genuine consumer confusion and decision error. 20 Significance is denoted at 5% by * and at 1% by **.
Conclusion
Using two independent datasets from the UK electricity market our results
show that the capacity of consumers to choose efficiently between suppliers may be limited, even when switching purely for price reasons. While the results are not necessarily representative of the general population, our estimations show that, at best, a fifth of the consumers in our samples actually lost surplus as a result of switching; and that, in aggregate, switching consumers appropriated only half of the maximum gains available to them. . The four specifications are respectively labelled as Oct99nochange, Oct99change, Jun00nochange and Jun00change (see appendix for further details). 21 The most commonly reported method changes are moving from credit to direct debit (41%) and credit to prepayment (38%). We do not allow for the unlikely possibility that the change was made after the process of changing suppliers. 
